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Abstract. This paper describes a novel antenna design for communi-
cating with ISO/IEC 14443A RFID cards at larger distances than the
normal 5-10 cm. The set-up consists of two antennas, one to activate
the card at the normal frequency of 13.56 MHz, and another to receive
its response at the higher harmonic frequency of 40.68 MHz. The strong
field required to power the card at larger distances is likely to drown out
its response. By detecting the higher harmonic frequencies originating
from the card’s response this problem is solved, making communication
at larger distances possible. The two antennas, placed 100 cm apart,
form an RFID gate that can communicate with cards in the middle of
the gate. This is a substantial improvement of the maximum skimming
distance of 25 cm reported in literature.
Keywords: RFID, contactless smart card, ISO/IEC 14443, skimming, eaves-
dropping
1 Introduction
This paper describes a method to extend the communication range with RFID
cards, more specifically ISO/IEC 14443 Type A proximity cards [8]. This type
is frequently used and it can be found in electronic passports, national ID cards,
contactless bank cards and many systems for building access control. It is also
compatible with the NFC (Near Field Communication) technology used in mo-
bile phones. The different types of RFID systems operate at different commu-
nication distances. For ISO/IEC 14443 the normal operating range is up to 10
centimeters, but most commercially available card readers only achieve a range
that is considerably shorter. Increasing the distance at which an RFID card can
be activated improves convenience but is a risk for security and privacy.
One of the limiting factors in achieving larger communication distances is
the required power for the card. The cards are passive, meaning they have no
battery, so they require a strong fluctuating magnetic field for power. But a
powerful antenna to active the card at large distances will generate a lot of
noise, making it hard to receive the card’s response. Here we achieve major
improvements by using a resonant coil as a 3rd harmonic antenna to receive
the card’s answer. The spectral and physical separation between the activation
and reception paths solves the problem that the high power activation antenna
drowns out the answer of the card.
The outline of this paper is as follows. Section 2 gives background information
on terminology, attack possibilities and the concepts of near field and far field.
Section 2 ends with an overview of related work, giving a summary of earlier
results with long range antennas. The next three sections describe the antenna
designs and experimental results for three scenarios: activating a card at larger
distances (Section 3), eavesdropping at larger distances (Section 4), and finally
the combination of the two scenarios, communication with a card (activation
and reading) at the maximum distance (Section 5). Finally, our conclusions are
summarized in Section 6.
2 Background
2.1 Terminology
RFID (Radio Frequency Identification) technology is a wireless communication
technique that uses the inductive coupling of coils to transfer data. ISO/IEC
14443 cards require no battery and are powered (and read) at short ranges via
electromagnetic (EM) induction. The ISO/IEC 14443 standard distinguishes two
types: A and B, which differ in modulation, coding and protocol initialization.
This paper only deals with Type A.
Communication with the data carrier, which is called the transponder, card or
tag, is started by a reader. Because this reader initiates the protocol, activates the
tag, and reads and writes information, it is also called the initiator or transceiver
[4]. For reasons of readability it is referred to as reader throughout this paper.
Before a tag is activated it must be brought into an alternating electromagnetic
field (EM-field) with the right frequency and power level. The distance at which
the tag is activated and can receive commands from the reader is called the
activation distance. The distance at which the reader can still interpret the
answer of the tag is the reply distance (see Fig. 1). The maximum distance at
which a reader can activate a tag and receive its response is called the skimming
distance.
In this paper the communication path from the reader to the tag is referred to
as Reader-to-Tag-link. The communication path in the other direction is called
the Tag-to-Reader-link. When these links are established and a complete initial-
ization protocol is executed, it is possible for the reader to communicate with
the tag. As the first step of communication the reader will receive and decode
the UID (unique ID) of the tag. In our experiments we checked for successful
reception of the UID to see if communication was working.
2.2 Attack possibilities
Different attack scenarios on RFID tags can be distinguished.
Fig. 1. Terminology
In an eavesdropping attack, an attacker intercepts the communication
between a tag that is being held close to a normal reader, using a separate
eavesdropping antenna. An eavesdropping attack is passive, meaning the eaves-
dropping antenna that the attacker uses does not have to power the tag, but
only listens in on the communication. Because the reader, in contrast to the
tag, is an active device and achieves a higher modulation index (ratio in signal
level between the unmodulated and modulated carrier), the Reader-to-Tag-link
is much easier to eavesdrop than the Tag-to-Reader-link.
In a skimming attack, an attacker secretly activates a tag and commu-
nicates with it. A skimming attack is active, meaning the antenna used has
to generate a field to power the tag. This limits the maximum distance for a
skimming attack compared to an eavesdropping attack. In a skimming attack a
compromise must be made between the activation distance and reply distance.
This is because increasing the power of an antenna may increase the activation
distance but at the same time decreases the reply distance, as the more powerful
and noisy signal from the reader makes it harder to detect the tag’s response.
We refer to the maximum distance at which a skimming device can communicate
with a tag as the skimming distance.
NB the term skimming for such an attack can be misleading if one thinks
of well-known mag-stripe skimming of bank cards. When skimming mag-stripes,
the attacker secretly reads the information on the mag-stripe, and can then make
copies to create clones of the original bank card that cannot be distinguished
from the original. For RFID tags, an attacker will not be able to create clones
with a skimming attack, as long as the protocol uses some form of challenge-
response.
Still, a skimming attack can be used as part of a relay attack, where the
communication with the tag is relayed to a genuine terminal. If an attacker can
for instance relay the communication from a contactless bank card to a payment
terminal, this can be considered a digital form of pickpocketing.
2.3 Near and far field
Around an antenna three zones can be distinguished, each with its own prop-
erties: the reactive near field, radiating near field and radiating far field (see
bottom of Fig. 1). The boundaries between these zones are hard to determine
precisely and depend on the surroundings and characteristics of the antenna.
Closest to the antenna a varying magnetic field is generated by the changing
current through the antenna. This magnetic field, in its turn, also generates a
changing electric field [4]. In close proximity of the reader antenna, the mag-
netic field is predominant over the electric field and this zone is known as the
reactive near field. Typically this is the area for RFID technology because tags
are powered by this magnetic field and communicate via this field. Moving away
from the reader the predominant magnetic component drops quickly by the third
power of the distance.
A change in voltage on the antenna terminals cannot result in a direct change
in the surrounding EM-field and this delay results in the transmission of elec-
tromagnetic waves. Being transmitted from the antenna they cannot retroact
on the antenna and this marks the end of the reactive near field and the start
of the radiating near field. For the antennas presented in this paper the border
between the reactive and the radiating near field is approximately at 36 cm from
the antenna following:
D ≈ 2L
2
λ
=
2× 22
22.11
= 0.36
where L is the length of the antenna, D the distance from the antenna and λ
the wavelength.
Far field radiation is the most common view on radio waves, e.g. radiation
that occurs when broadcasting a radio program or sending a message with a
mobile phone. For the radiating far field the intensity is inversely proportional
to the distance (1/D). The electric and magnetic components, although perpen-
dicular to each other, are in time phase and equal in energy level. The transition
to far field radiation marks the unpassable barrier for RFID technology because
it is practically impossible to activate a tag. For the ISO/IEC 14443 RFID pro-
tocol with a 13.56 MHz carrier frequency the transition from the radiating near
field to the radiation far field starts at approximately 3.5 m following:
D ≈ λ
2pi
=
22.11
6.28
= 3.52
For activation and hence skimming we are typically restricted to the reactive
near field, whereas eavesdropping is also possible in the radiating far field. But,
as will be shown in this paper, it is possible to go beyond the 36 cm with a
skimming set-up.
2.4 Related work
Kirschenbaum and Wool [10] built a low cost ($100) antenna that achieved a
skimming distance of 25 cm. The antenna is a 40 cm diameter copper tube an-
tenna. The whole set-up is powered by a 12 V battery. They expected that their
design could be further improved to achieve a skimming distance of approxi-
mately 35 cm.
Hancke [6, 7] describes activation and eavesdropping experiments with differ-
ent antenna sizes and power usage. The largest activation distance he reports is
27 cm using an A3-sized antenna powered with 4 W. For the maximum eaves-
dropping distance he reports 400 cm for the Tag-to-Reader-link using a magnetic
field antenna. Hancke notes that activating at a tag at a large distance is bad for
the possible eavesdropping distance. When he combines activation and eaves-
dropping (using two antennas) in a skimming attack he uses a smaller activation
distance of 15 cm (using an A5-sized antenna and a 4 W amplifier) where he can
eavesdrop at 145 cm.
Earlier, Kfir and Wool [9] already predicted skimming distances that could
be achieved with various costs and skills, based on experiments and simulations,
but without producing a proof-of-concept. Our experiment results are in line
with their predictions, as they predict that skimming up to 50 cm should be
possible.
The use of higher harmonic frequencies for eavesdropping is not new. En-
gelhardt et al. [2] demonstrate that eavesdropping on the Tag-to-Reader-link is
possible for ISO/IEC 14443 Type A tags at 18 m using the 3rd harmonic. In
this scenario a normal reader is used to power the tag. Engelhardt et al. show
that a successful detection of the modulation products in the far field relies on
the coupling to nearby cables, and that with proper shielding of the cables the
harmonics become undetectable.
Carrying out a relay attack not only involves communication with the victims
tag, but also interacting with a genuine terminal. Oren et al. [11] looked into
extending the range at which one can interact with an ISO/IEC 14443 reader.
They reach a 115 cm range with a relay attack, using an active tag to overcome
the short range of a passive tag for the Tag-to-Reader-link.
Francis et al. [5] demonstrated that NFC phones can be used to skim tags
and then perform relay attacks. Such phones have a short operating range, but
have the advantages of being cheap and readily available.
3 Activation at greater distances
3.1 Objective and test set-up
Our first experiments were done on a relatively straightforward skimmer set-up
similar to [10] with antenna designs adapted from [12]. Putting two amplifiers
in cascade it was possible to power a 50 x 50 cm, transformer-matched, mag-
netic loop antenna with 60 W. This resulted in a successful skimming distance
of approximately 40 cm. The possibility to achieve this distance was already
predicted by [9], though we needed a slightly larger and more powerful antenna
than predicted. (Kfir and Wool base their prediction on a 40 x 40 cm antenna
with the current limited to 4 A). While increasing the amplification, the match-
ing components (necessary to adapt the antenna impedance to a 50 Ω regime for
maximum power transfer) heated up to 120◦ C within two minutes and resulted
in a mismatch that eventually broke the antenna and the reader.
By improving the design of the antenna with a gamma matching circuit,
it was possible to keep the antenna working over a longer period of time while
activating the tag over a long distance. The gamma matching circuit was adapted
from [12] and [1] to require the smallest number of high power components
compared to other matching strategies (see Fig. 2). We could use this antenna
for activation at larger distances, but then the antenna could no longer receive
the tag’s response. To verify that the tag indeed was activated a pick-up coil was
used and held in close proximity to the tag. The signal from this small antenna
was fed to the reader to close the communication loop.
Fig. 2. Gamma-matched antenna
3.2 Results
With the gamma-matched activation antenna and a power of approximately 60
W, an activation distance of 60 cm was reached. The tag’s UID was received by
the separate pick-up coil and decoded by the reader. Because the same reader
was used to power the tag and to decode the answer, the received signal from
the tag is in phase with the carrier that was sent by the reader (synchronous
detection). Receiving the answer with the pick-up coil was only possible up to a
distance of 5 cm from the tag.
4 Eavesdropping using higher harmonics
4.1 Objective and test set-up
The limiting factor when communicating with an RFID tag is not the activation
of the tag, but receiving its answer. The tag uses load modulation with a sub-
carrier (derived from the carrier frequency) to send its answer to the reader. The
limitation of this technique is the ability to alter the strong EM-field generated
by the reader by switching on and off a small load on the antenna of the tag. If
the field from the antenna is too strong, the influence of tag on this field is too
small to be observed by the reader. The effect of the reader on the carrier signal
is visible as the dips (modulation index of 100%) on the left side in Fig. 3. The
effect of the tag as the smaller dips (and the increase of amplitude) on the right
side.
Fig. 3. Reader-to-Tag-link (left) and Tag-to-Reader-link (right)
More power leads to a decrease of the modulation index and signal to noise
ratio (SNR), resulting in a smaller effect on the activation antenna. Therefore we
started working with two antennas, one for activating the tag, one for receiving
its response. This separation is possible because the information from the reader
and tag is not only present in the fundamental frequency band (13.56 MHz ±
847.5 kHz) but also in multitudes of those frequency bands (2 x 13.56 MHz, 3 x
13.56 MHz, 4 x 13.56 MHz, 5 x 13.56 MHz, etc). The sidebands (fharmonic± 847.5
kHz) contain the information of the tag.
There are different sources where the multitudes of the fundamental fre-
quency could originate from: the tag, the reader, but also from the saturation
of an amplifier. The most likely candidate to produce these frequency compo-
nents is a non-linear component like the rectifying bridge in the tag, formed by
four diodes D1 to D4 as shown in Fig. 4). These diodes load the antenna coil,
modelled by L1, and provide a DC voltage for the rest of the circuitry of the
tag.
Fig. 4. Electrical circuit of a tag (adapted from: http://rfid-handbook.de/about-
rfid.html)
To prove our conjecture that the higher harmonic signals originate from the
tag, a self-made replica of a standard ISO/IEC 14443 tag was produced with
the same dimension and characteristics as a standard RFID card. A comparison
was made between two situations; without the diodes on the replica (Fig. 5) and
with diodes mounted on the replica (Fig. 6).
The markers indicate the fundamental, 3rd, and 5th harmonics. Measurements
show that by mounting the diodes the power of all the harmonics increases and
the power of the fundamental decreases. There is an increase with 15.43 dB for
the 3th harmonic and with 29.3 dB for the 5th harmonic. At the same time the
loading of the EM-field results in a decrease of the fundamental frequency of
6.17 dB. An overview of all the harmonics is shown in Table 1.
Fig. 5. Without diodes
Fig. 6. With diodes
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
13.56 MHz 27.12 MHz 40.68 MHz 54.24 MHz 67.80 MHz
[dBm] [dBm] [dBm] [dBm] [dBm]
With diodes 7 -34 -30 -45 -45
Without diodes 13 -41 -45 -60 -74
Table 1. Higher order harmonics
These harmonics do not yet contain any information from the tag. They have
to be modulated with the data from the tag (via IC2 and switch T1 in Fig. 4)
before the information will be present in the frequency bands fharmonic ± 847.5
kHz.
A positive side effect when measuring the signal from the tag at these higher
frequencies is that there will be less noise from the environment according to [3].
To measure the harmonics (and the modulation products) up to the 5th order
(67.80 MHz), a sensitive broadband antenna from the Lofar project4 was avail-
able, that is normally used for astronomical observations. With the activation
antenna from Section 3 it was possible to activate the tag at any distance up
to 60 cm. The signal coming from the Lofar antenna was digitized with the Na-
tional Instruments PXIe-5665 spectrum analyzer. In a LabVIEW program the
results were digitally filtered and the spectra were extracted from the IQ data
stream.
4.2 Results
With this set-up an eavesdropping distance of 3.7 meters was reached at which
the answer of the tag (and the request from the reader) could still be retrieved.
This distance can be reached measuring at 40.68 MHz (3rd harmonic) and also at
67.80 MHz (5th harmonic). In Fig. 7 the IQ data stream is shown measured with
the National Instruments PXIe-5665 spectrum analyzer tuned to 40.68 MHz.
The first peaks (until ± 80 µs) show data from the reader to the tag (REQA,
REQuest command, type A [8]). The answer from the tag starts at ± 160 µs
(ATQA, Answer To reQuest, type A). Comparing Fig. 7 with Fig. 3 it is clear
that it follows the outline and time base of the AM-signal.
Engelhardt et al. already used higher harmonics for eavesdropping, reporting
an eavesdropping range of 18 m, also using the 3rd harmonic of the original
signal [2]. They showed that cables attached to the reader were responsible for
(re)transmitting the harmonics into free space and that with proper shielding of
the reader these harmonics were undetectable. The same phenomenon occurs in
our configuration and also [11] reports a high range for the Tag-to-Reader-link
due to coupling effects.
Unfortunately, harmonics were only detected by the Lofar antenna if the tag
was held in the corner of the activation antenna. Engelhardt et al. report the
4 http://www.lofar.org
Fig. 7. Response at 40.68 MHz
same effect with the commercial RFID reader they used for activating the tag.
They also had to place the tag in the corner of the reader to optimize results.
The observations made in the two paragraphs above, namely that (i) the
modulated harmonics cannot be detected in the far field without a coupling
effect to neighboring cables, and (ii) these higher harmonics are only present if
the tag is held at a very precise location close to the reader, suggest that while
the use of higher harmonics may be useful for passive eavesdropping attacks, it
is not useful for active skimming attacks. After all, in a skimming attack the tag
must be activated at a large distance. Concluding, the achieved eavesdropping
distance looks promising but this set-up cannot be used in a skimming attack
scenario.
5 Skimming using higher harmonics
5.1 Objective and test set-up
The RFID signal originates from the chip inside the reader as a square wave
and contains all the harmonics according to the Fourier series. Together with
the fundamental frequency these harmonics are amplified, reach the activation
antenna and, despite the fact that it is not tuned for these frequencies, they are
still transmitted (mainly in the reactive near field). Besides the carrier, the tag
modulates these harmonics resulting in a combined effect with the harmonics
generated by the diodes on the tag (Section 4.1). Placed in the far field, the
Lofar antenna could only receive the answer of the tag if this signal coupled into
a nearby cable. It was not possible to place the Lofar antenna closer to the tag
and activation antenna (in the near field) because it was too sensitive for the
fundamental frequency. Although this fundamental frequency was outside the
bandwidth of the antenna, the high power in the 13.56 MHz band still saturated
the Lofar antenna and made a sensitive measurement impossible.
Measurements with a small pick-up coil in the near field of the tag showed
that higher harmonics were still detectable at activation distances up to 20 cm.
Besides that, we observed the decrease of power of the fundamental in the pick-
up coil when placing the rectifying diodes in the self-made replica. This led to
the idea of amplifying the third harmonic in the antenna of the tag by placing a
second resonant coil in its near-field (< 3.5 m) and use it as a receiving antenna.
To prove this idea a new magnetic loop receiving antenna was made resonant
at 40.68 MHz (undamped, resulting in a high Q-factor). Measurements with the
receiving antenna placed at 12 cm from the tag showed an increase of the third
harmonic of approximately 22 dB.
5.2 Results
Receiving the tag’s response at a different frequency than the activation fre-
quency makes it easier to retrieve the answer of the tag in the received signal.
With the high power activation antenna and the selective receive antenna it is
possible to use the maximum power available to activate the tag over a long
distance, without the risk of damaging the receiving back-end and measurement
equipment. With these two different antennas, tuned to two different frequencies,
we made an RFID skimmer gate, shown in Fig. 8.
The square activation antenna, on the left side in the photo, is tuned to 13.56
MHz and activates the tag. The round receiving antenna, on the right side in the
photo, is tuned to 40.68 MHz, enhances the 3rd harmonic and receives the reply
of tag. It was also possible to tune the receive antenna to the 5th harmonic,
but this did not result in a better reception of the answer. Albeit attenuated
strongly, the carrier frequency is also received by the receiving antenna and, in
contrast to the other antenna designs, without saturating the low-noise amplifier
or reception circuit of the reader. The answer of the tag is decoded real time
without any significant latency or delay.
The two main parameters in the configuration of our RFID gate are the width
of the gate, i.e. the distance between the two antennas, and the activation power,
i.e. the power from the amplifiers to the activation antenna. Each combination
of width and power level results in a different communication range over which
a tag can be activated and its response can be picked up. This communication
range is determined at one end by the maximum activation distance and at the
Fig. 8. RFID Skimming gate
Gate width Power Activation distance Reply distance Communication range
[cm] [W] [cm] [cm] [from activation side of gate]
70 14-22 60 60 from 10 to 60 cm
90 14-22 75 20 from 70 to 75 cm
100 75-88 52.5 52.5 from 49.5 to 52.5 cm
Table 2. Results for RFID gate, where communication range is measured from the
side of the gate formed by the activation antenna, i.e. the left side of the gate in Fig. 8
other end by the maximum reply distance. Table 2 gives the results achieved for
three different widths of the gate, using different power levels:
– An RFID gate of 70 cm. Communication with a tag is possible over a range
of 50 cm between the antennas, i.e. almost the full width of the gate except
very close to either end. This is a major improvement compared to the earlier
reported skimming distance of 25 cm [2].
– An RFID gate of 90 cm. This set-up achieves a long activation distance
(of 75 cm from the activation antenna), while keeping the possibility to
communicate with the tag at 20 cm of the receiving antenna. This is a
substantial improvement of the maximum activation distances reported in
the literature so far (27 cm) [3]. However, skimming – i.e. activating the card
and receiving its response – is only possible over a very small range, 5 cm
wide, in this configuration.
– An RFID gate of 100 cm. This configuration requires a large amount of
power, and allows both activation and reception at just over 50 cm. It reaches
the maximum skimming distance: interaction with the tag is possible if it is
held close to the middle of the gate.
The results above are obtained without the use of additional DSP software (Dig-
ital Signal Processing), using hardware from a standard card reader. We have
strong indications that with better filtering techniques and a different amplifier
longer distances and communication ranges are possible. The experiments were
carried out using a standard ISO/IEC 14443A tag, where we used the reception
of the card’s UID upon activation as evidence that the card was working.
We also experimented with various types of cards to confirm that after send-
ing their UID they can also carry out their normal functionality. They generally
did, except that, as expected, the range may be reduced if this functionality
requires a lot of computing power, esp. for asymmetric cryptography. For ex-
ample, experiments using a programmable Java Card showed that, when using
the same amount of activation power, the range over which the RFID gate can
power an RSA computation on the card is smaller than the range over which it
can power a DES or AES encryption. When gradually sliding the tag away from
the activation antenna first RSA fails, followed by both DES and AES, which
fail together with all functionality of the card. So for this card only RSA, and
not AES and DES, required a shorter distance. Of course, such characteristics
will be highly depend on the specific processor hardware inside a card.
We also observed the effect of the orientation of the tag by changing the
position relative to the antennas. Ideally the tag is parallel with the antennas,
for optimal inductive coupling. However, placing a tag at an angle of 45◦ with
respect to the antennas still resulted in successful communication. Increasing
the angle above 50◦ communication quickly deteriorated because of the reduced
coupling.
Depending on the skimming scenario (secretly activate a tag and start a
communication session) it is possible to tune the antenna arrangement. The most
practical scenario will be the 70 cm gate. With this set-up a large communication
range within the gate is achieved and not much power is needed (22 W compared
to 88 W in the 100 cm set-up). The 70 cm gate width is wide enough to let people
pass, and when the victim is forced to make a turn between the antennas (for
example in a voting booth or fitting room), the chance of a successful readout is
significantly increased. More compact solutions are also possible by placing the
antennas close together (see Fig. 9). Here the tag does not have to be between
the two antennas, but it can be held near them. Because the antennas are tuned
to different frequencies there is little influence on each other and a skimming
distance of 60 cm is achieved.
Currently, no commercial RFID readers are found achieving similar results
for the ISO/IEC 14443A protocol. There are manufacturers that also use dual
frequency technologies, but this requires non-standard tags equipped with two
antennas. The advantage of the method presented in this paper is that widely
available tags can be used without any adaption on the side of the tag and at
the data rates the protocol specifies.
Fig. 9. Compact RFID Skimmer
6 Conclusions
We presented several antenna set-ups to study the practical communication lim-
its of ISO/IEC 14443 Type A RFID technology. The final result is a new antenna
design that significantly increases the communication range of RFID tags. The
set-up is an RFID gate formed by two antennas, one activating the card at
13.56 MHz and another antenna receiving its response at the third harmonic
frequency at 40.68 MHz. This RFID skimming gate is the first working proto-
type using higher harmonics for communicating with a tag over a long range in
the near field.
The activation antenna can withstand 100 W, enough to activate the tag over
a large distance. Normally when activating a tag over larger distances its answer
cannot be received anymore due to the reduced coupling with the activation
antenna. This is solved by enhancing and receiving the third harmonic of the
tag’s answer by placing a undamped loop antenna in the near field.
The two antennas can be placed in several configurations, for example to
form
– a gate with a width of 100 cm, which can communicate with a tag held near
the center between the two antennas, or
– a gate with a width of 70 cm, which can communicate with a tag over almost
the entire range between the antennas.
Our results so far have been obtained without using any additional DSP (Digital
Signal Processing) software. We have strong indications that with better filter-
ing techniques and a different low-noise amplifier longer distances and wider
communication ranges are possible.
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